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1. Alfred N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1938), p. 183.
Newton’s methodology for physics was an overwhelming success. But the forces
which he introduced left Nature still without meaning or value. . . . A dead nature
aims at nothing. It is the essence of life that it exists for its own sake, as the in-
trinsic reaping of value. 
A. N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought1
Introduction
In his long career, Alfred North Whitehead was, variously, a math-
ematician, a speculative physicist, a historian of science, a philoso-
pher of science, and a philosopher in his own right. He thus occu-
pies a perhaps unique place within recent Western thought. Not
only did he advance scientific thought, he also developed a novel,
systematic philosophical understanding of science based on a deep
historical appreciation of both its theoretical premises and its practi-
cal procedures. Whitehead did not dismiss science, he did not see it
as divorced from philosophy—nor did he accept the premises that,
he maintained, still inform much of modern science. One of his
great achievements, which will be taken up later in this paper, is his
insistence that science, philosophy, the humanities, and social the-
ory all require a renewed conception of nature (in the broadest sense
of the word), one that goes beyond strict scientific limitations, be-
yond any form of biological essentialism or reliance upon some no-
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tion of the ultimate laws of physics or nature. Through his philoso-
phy of organism, Whitehead aims to develop a concept of nature
that is able to incorporate all existence, thereby bringing together
the empirical, the material, the social, the aesthetic, and thinking
beings.
Gilles Deleuze shares with Whitehead the desire to develop a new
ontological approach, one that goes beyond simplistic divisions or
categorizations of the world into subject/object, natural/social, dead/
alive, and so on. Like Whitehead, he was also keenly aware of the
need to situate such philosophical endeavors within a full apprecia-
tion of the history of philosophy. Furthermore, he was acutely aware
of the need to uncover and develop the inextricable links, which have
often remained hidden, between this history and other realms of
thought and practice, such as the political, the social, and the aesthetic.
To attempt to outline all the similarities and dissimilarities, con-
junctions and disjunctions between Whitehead and Deleuze is be-
yond the scope of this paper.2 Yet it would seem clear that their in-
terrelations and dual attempts to develop what might be termed a
nonessentialist ontology is of both relevance and importance across
a range of fields at the start of the twenty-first century. In a time of
academic uncertainty and renewal—with the increasing focus on in-
terdisciplinarity and the increasing recognition of the need to re-
consider the apparently unbridgeable dichotomy between the nat-
ural and the social, the need to move beyond overly culturalist or
Foucauldian accounts of subjectivity, the need to renew and develop
the interrelations of science and philosophy—Whitehead and
Deleuze offer striking interventions which may prove fruitful for re-
searchers thinking through a range of problems. One concrete ex-
ample of this is the recent conference (May 2005) devoted solely to
Whitehead and Deleuze, organized by the University of Leuven (Bel-
gium) and held at the Royal Flemish Academy of Arts and Science in
Brussels. This brought together an eclectic group of scholars from all
over the world who were working on Whitehead and Deleuze, and it
demonstrated both the extent and the depth of their current impact
across philosophy, cultural theory, literature and literary criticism,
mathematics, and sociology and social theory. While this paper will
not be able to do justice to all such ramifications, I hope that it will
operate as an introduction to some of the more significant aspects of
the perspective that Whitehead and Deleuze share. In particular, 
2. A good introduction to the similarities of the philosophical approaches of White-
head and Deleuze can be found in Arnaud Villani, “Deleuze et Whitehead,” Revue de
métaphysique et de morale 101:2 (1996): 245-265.
I will focus on their understanding of the processual character of ma-
teriality or physicality, and the challenge they pose to customary sci-
entific conceptions of these. I will also consider the status of subjec-
tivity within their work (in relation to their understanding of
materiality), and will conclude with a brief example of how their
work might be applied within social theory to provide a forceful ac-
count of the interrelatedness of materiality and subjectivity in the
world.
The Bifurcation of Nature
Throughout his philosophical career, Whitehead was intent on ar-
guing against what he described as the bifurcation of nature. He de-
scribes this position as follows:
[One] way of phrasing this theory which I am arguing against is to bifurcate
nature into two divisions, namely into the nature apprehended in awareness
and the nature which is the cause of awareness. The nature which is in fact ap-
prehended in awareness holds within it the greenness of the trees, the song of
the birds, the warmth of the sun, the hardness of the chairs, and the feel of
the velvet. The nature which is the cause of awareness is the conjectured sys-
tem of molecules and electrons which so affects the mind as to produce the
awareness of apparent nature.3
Whitehead views the tacit acceptance of such a theory as having se-
vere consequences for our understanding of nature. Furthermore, it
has led to the division of academic inquiry into discrete realms that
deal with subject matters so diverse, so different, that they are un-
able to communicate—indeed, they might as well be talking about
different universes. For example, the material (natural) world has
been set out as the province of science, while subjectivity and the ex-
periences and interrelations of thinking subjects (humans) have
been given over to social theory or the humanities. This has led to
problems for both fields of inquiry.
Within science, the world has become (epistemologically speak-
ing) an inert, external entity divorced from the experiences of think-
ing subjects. Nature, in its broadest sense, has been reduced to a life-
less realm, devoid of feeling and value; the position and status of
thinking subjects within such a scheme has become unexplainable.
A conceptual wedge has been driven between a supposedly objective
world without meaning upon which science reports, and the “mean-
ingful” realms of human existence with which social theory or the
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3. Alfred North Whitehead, Concept of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1964), pp. 30—31.
humanities deal. This has also produced both epistemological and
practical problems for the latter disciplines in their attempts to ac-
count for the physicality and actuality of subjects and subjectivity.
For example, sociologists may have succeeded in the important task
of uncovering the political and ideological dimensions of gender,
but, as has recently been pointed out, this still seems to leave bio-
logical “sex” firmly in the control of the “real” sciences.4 I shall re-
turn to this in my conclusion. For the moment, put simply, there is
still a tendency among many to feel that, despite the best and most
sophisticated efforts of literary theorists, philosophers, sociologists,
anthropologists, and so on, science (and scientists) still maintain
some kind of a direct access to the “real reality” (be it in terms of
genes, illness, or whatever). And, this direct access is somehow tied
to the priority that modern science has given to describing the very
physicality of the world and indeed life.
It is this tension between the very physicality of existence (to
which it would seem only science has full claim) and the experiences
of subjects (which thereby become the purview of the humanities
and social theory) that, I will claim, Whitehead and Deleuze may en-
able us to move beyond. In the remainder of the paper I will there-
fore analyze how both Whitehead and Deleuze reject the division of
the complexity of existence into oversimplified categories such as
the natural and the social. They invite science, social theory, and the
humanities to reconsider the ontological assumptions that subtend
their epistemological positions. One important consequence of their
work, which will be drawn out in the concluding section, is the need
for a dramatic reconsideration of the status of both social and phys-
ical existence by going beyond any simple distinction between the
realms of the natural and the social. In short, in this paper I will ul-
timately contend that it is the ongoing and eventful process of exis-
tence that is social, and it is within this that the subjects and objects
of nature come to be (and are passed beyond).
Whitehead’s Actual Entities
While it is, perhaps, well known that Deleuze develops an ontol-
ogy that avoids foundationalism or essentialism by prioritizing be-
coming over being, some have held that such a prioritization is
evoked at the expense of notions of materiality or physicality. In
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4. Karen Barad, “Getting Real: Technoscientific Practices and the Materialization of Re-
ality,” in differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 10:2 (1998): 87-128; Mariam
Fraser, “What Is the Matter of Feminist Criticism?” Economy and Society 31:4 (2002): 606-
625; Vicky Kirby, Telling Flesh: The Substance of the Corporeal (London: Routledge, 1997).
these readings, flux and flight are figured as the mainstays of
Deleuze’s ontological position. Such readings tend to concentrate on
passages like the following:
We have to reflect for a long time to understand what it means to make an af-
firmation of becoming. In the first place it is doubtless to say that there is only
becoming. . . . But we must also affirm the being of becoming, we say that be-
coming affirms being or that being is affirmed in becoming.5
The overemphasis on such statements has led many to miss the
point that while the focus on becoming is an integral element of
Deleuze’s philosophy, he also develops a robust account of the very
physicality of existence. I will show that Whitehead’s less-well-
known ontology also prioritizes becoming over being, but is, per-
haps, clearer in advocating a notion of physicality. His emphasis on
“stubborn fact” is always brought to the fore;6 this may not only
serve as a helpful counterbalance to those who focus on what might
be termed the “joy of flux,” but also point to the importance of ma-
teriality and physicality within Deleuze’s ontology. This is not, ulti-
mately, to dismiss scientific accounts, but to enable both science and
other forms of theory to investigate the processual character of all
existence.
For Whitehead, stubborn fact is comprised of “actual entities,”
“the final real things of which the world is made up.”7 Hence, he
holds, analysis must start with this stubborn fact, with the very stuff
of the universe considered as individuated items of matter or mate-
riality. “Thus the ultimate metaphysical truth is atomism. . . . But
atomism does not exclude complexity and universal relativity.”8
However, such statements are merely the first stage in his argument.
The role of actual entities, in Whitehead’s work, is to establish a
form of materiality that does not rely on the traditional scientific-
philosophical rendering of physicality in terms of discrete, self-iden-
tical objects: “the notion of the self-contained particle of matter,
self-sufficient within its local habitation is an abstraction.”9 Actual
entities have the role of explaining the process of materiality.
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5. Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (London: Athlone Press, 1983), p. 23.
6. Alfred N. Whitehead, Process and Reality. An Essay In Cosmology, corrected ed., ed.
David Ray Griffin D., and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1978), p. xiv and
passim.
7. Ibid., p. 18.
8. Ibid., pp. 25-26.
9. Whitehead, Modes (above, n. 1), p. 189.
Whitehead refers to his overall system as a philosophy of organ-
ism, and for him all actual entities can be considered as “creatures”
that have both materiality and subjectivity:
The philosophies of substance presuppose a subject which then encounters a da-
tum, and then reacts to the datum. The philosophy of organism presupposes a
datum which is met with feelings, and progressively attains the unity of a sub-
ject. But with this doctrine, “superject” would be a better term than “subject.”10
In order to avoid the split between the world viewed as a physical
given (hence under the purview of science) and, distinct from this,
the analytical arena of thinking, perceiving subjects (under the
purview of the humanities), Whitehead offers a reconfigured con-
ception of subjectivity. Subjectivity is the “past hurling itself into a
new transcendent fact. It is the flying dart . . . hurled beyond the
bounds of the world.”11 It is the act of being thrown from the past
into the future that constitutes being: the being of becoming. This
will entail that at the human level, subjectivity12 is not so much a
question of what something or someone is, but what they are be-
coming and, concomitantly, what they are “ceasing to be.”13 And,
such subjectivity is not limited to humans: it is an integral element
within the universe. This, therefore, widens the grasp of what it
means to be a creature.
However, it should be noted that Whitehead’s granting of subjec-
tivity to all items of materiality does not entail some kind of panpsy-
chism. As will be discussed in more detail shortly, his extended con-
cept of subjectivity is designed to provide a consistent philosophical
approach that views neither objects nor subjects as primary or origi-
nary. Instead, experience and experiences become his ontological
fulcrum. It should also be noted that Whitehead wants to avoid any
concept of an enduring subjectivity that subtends different experi-
ences; each subject must be created anew on each occasion:14
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10. Whitehead, Process (above, n. 6), p. 155.
11. Alfred N. Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: The Free Press, 1967), p. 177.
12. It should be noted that, technically speaking, Whitehead does not view human
subjectivity as directly describable in terms of superjectivity. However, the process by
which different human subjects come to be is analgous to it, though he would prefer
to situate such becomings within his theory of propositions. Whitehead, Process
(above, n. 6), pp. 256-82. Whitehead’s theory of propositions has not been introduced
in this paper for simplicity’s sake.
13. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? Trans. G. Burchell and H
Tomlinson (London: Verso, 1994), p. 112.
14. Whitehead does provide an account of endurance but it is not premised on tradi-
tional conceptions of subjectivity.
“Descartes in his own philosophy conceives the thinker as creating
the occasional thought. The philosophy of organism inverts the or-
der, and conceives the thought as a constituent operation in the cre-
ation of the occasional thinker.”15
Actual Entities: How They Come To Be
To summarize: Whitehead’s ontological position focuses upon
process and becoming as the ultimate characterization of being and
of materiality. It aims to avoid a positing of subjects or objects as the
starting point for meaning or existence; instead, it emphasizes flux
(i.e., becoming), but moves quickly to an account of the enduring
status of materiality. In this way, it attempts to circumvent the tradi-
tional distinction between the fixed objects analyzed by science and
the thinking or thought of human subjects as analyzed by the hu-
manities. Given that an actual entity is not a thing, as commonly
conceived, and (to further complicate matters) is to be defined in
terms of its process, Whitehead faces the task of offering a way into
thinking about the status of such entities. His response is to state
that “experience involves a becoming, that becoming means that some-
thing becomes, and that what becomes involves repetition transformed
into novel immediacy.”16 For him, the emphasis is upon the “how” of
becoming. Being is located neither in the object itself nor in the sub-
ject that perceives it. This leaves becoming as primary. But this is not
an inert becoming: it is not the mere passage of matter in flux. The
key to Whitehead’s concept of becoming is that each becoming oc-
curs in a specific environment and in a specific fashion. That which
both enables becoming and differentiates this becoming from any
other is the way in which the becoming unfolds. 
In order to account for this prioritization of the how of becoming,
Whitehead introduces the notion of “prehensions.” Literally, this
term refers to how an actual entity grasps its environment. Prehen-
sions are a crucial element within the Whiteheadian framework:
they are the means by which he explains the utterly relational char-
acter of existence; they describe the passage by which all entities are
related. “I use the term ‘prehension’ for the general way in which
the occasion of experience can include, as part of its own essence,
any other entity.”17 Prehensions enable Whitehead to move beyond
simplistic descriptions of a world divided into subjects and objects,
and they serve as the basis for his description of the process whereby
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15. Whitehead, Process (above, n. 6), p. 151.
16. Ibid., pp. 136-137 (emphasis in original).
17. Whitehead, Adventures (above, n. 11), p. 234.
materiality and physicality come to be. They enable the description
of the complexity of the process whereby subjects are both created
and create themselves through the assimilation of previously diverse
elements. It is in this respect that he states that every superject con-
sists of three factors: (a) the “subject” that is prehending, namely,
the actual entity in which that prehension is a concrete element; (b)
the “datum” that is prehended; (c) the “subjective form,” which is
how that subject prehends that datum.18
Hence, Whitehead’s theory of the divisibility of actual entities into
prehensions might be characterized as follows:19 “Someone is listen-
ing to some music produced through a CD player.” The main prehen-
sions here, according to Whitehead’s schema described above, are:
(a) the person listening to the music;
(b) the music that is being listened to;
(c) the manner in which the music is being listened to.
None of these elements is either an object or a subject, for they
are elements within the process that goes to make up an actual en-
tity. So it is not a person (or a someone) in terms of a subject who is
listening: the music that is being listened to is an integral element
within the formation of that subject.20 Further, it is not simply an
admixture of the music and the person that makes up the subject:
the crucial element is the way in which the music is received. For ex-
ample, the listener is receiving the music in an inattentive way, and
is becoming bored. Or, the listener is receiving the music in a relaxed
manner, and is becoming tired.
There is also an emphasis on the materiality of such prehensions.
This follows from Whitehead’s denial of the preexistence of a listen-
ing subject, and his emphasis on the music as an integral element
within the process of the real constitution of that subject. He also
stresses the manner in which these elements are combined or inte-
grated. None of the elements of the process is separate, nor do they
have any ontological priority; they all go together to create the spe-
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18. See Whitehead, Process (above, n. 6), pp. 221-2.
19. See Whitehead’s discussion of the process of the hearing of music: ibid., pp. 233-
235.
20. With regard to my use of “subject” here, it should be noted that, I follow White-
head when he states: “The term ‘subject’ has been retained because in this sense it is fa-
miliar in philosophy. But it is misleading. The term ‘superject’ would be better” (ibid.,
p. 222). Hence, “subject” will be used intermittently and interchangeably with “super-
ject” in order to avoid overuse of terminology; for the most part, however “subject”
should be read as “superject”.
cific subject—for example, a bored listener. Of course, this is to
greatly oversimplify (and to leap from the metaphysical to the hu-
man rather too quickly, perhaps) in order to make an explanatory
point. It is envisaged as the barest sketch of Whitehead’s ideas. For
example, what if the person is sitting in an uncomfortable chair, or
can smell fresh coffee, or is eating bitter chocolate, or the light is too
bright? These will all influence not only the manner in which the
music is received, but the range of prehensions available—which in
turn will both limit and extend the range of potential outcomes
(subjects/superjects). However, what is crucial in this example is the
utter integration of the prehension and the subject, and their indis-
solubility in terms of their actual existence.
At the same time, Whitehead is not interested in simply describ-
ing the coming into existence of single entities, of one subject or su-
perject. His ontology is one that emphasizes the individuality of all
becoming, but only insofar as each becoming is situated within and
emerges from a wider complex of becoming. This wider complex is
termed, by Whitehead, “the extensive continuum.”
The Extensive Continuum
“This extensive continuum is one relational complex. . . . It un-
derlies the whole world, past, present and future.”21 Such a state-
ment may seem to express a foundationalist or essentialist perspec-
tive, in that it appears to characterize the extensive continuum as a
ground subtending all existence. This might seem to run the danger
of positing a fixed, external, inert ground replete with objects, simi-
lar to that presumed by much of conventional science. However,
such is certainly not Whitehead’s position, as indicated by the term
“relational.” He also states: “It [the extensive continuum] is not a
fact prior to the world.”22 For Whitehead, this extensive continuum
is infinite, in that it is not bounded or determined by any other ele-
ment. It is “‘real’ because it expresses a fact derived from the actual
world and concerning the actual contemporary world. All actual en-
tities are related according to the determinations of this contin-
uum.”23 It might be said that the concept of the extensive contin-
uum is part of Whitehead’s ongoing development of his earlier work
on relativity within a wider philosophical scheme.24
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21. Ibid., p. 66.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Alfred N. Whitehead, The Principle of Relativity with Applications to Physical Science
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922).
The facticity of this reality results from the extensive continuum’s
being comprised wholly of actual entities: “Actual entities atomize
the extensive continuum.”25 However, the extensive continuum
considered as an agglomeration of actual entities refers to actual en-
tities not in terms of process, in terms of their becoming, but in
terms of their already having become. In his initial summary of his
philosophy of organism, Whitehead states that “actual entities ‘per-
petually perish’26 subjectively, but are immortal objectively.”27 An ac-
tual entity’s being lasts only as long as its becoming. When it has be-
come it dies; insofar as it is no longer becoming, it no longer has any
being. But this does not mean that it disappears: on the contrary, it
then becomes an element in the potential creation of new entities, it
is established as an element that new becomings may use as the data
for their own becoming. In this way it passes from being a subject to
being an object; “thus subject and object are relative terms.”28 It is in
this latter sense that an actual entity acquires objective immortality
and as such constitutes an element within the extensive continuum.
Following his explicit attempt to prioritize “stubborn fact,”
Whitehead returns to the becoming of actual entities. In this respect
the extensive continuum operates as a field of potential for the be-
coming of an actual entity: “In the mere continuum there are con-
trary potentialities; in the actual world there are definite atomic ac-
tualities determining one coherent system of real divisions
throughout the region of actuality.”29 Thus, a distinction must be
made between the abstract notion of potentiality, as that which in-
forms the process and creativity of the universe (i.e., the mere con-
tinuum), and the region of actuality. For it is the latter that com-
prises the contemporary actualizations of such potentiality within
which the creation of actual entities occurs. This means that al-
though Whitehead posits an unlimited potentiality throughout the
universe, the real actualizations of such potentiality occur in refer-
ence to a world that is in some way bounded. This is Whitehead’s re-
newed conception of nature, which is intended to replace that
which predominates within much of science, social theory, and the
humanities. The whole of nature has now become the realm of in-
terrelated experiences of subjects (superjects). However, Whitehead
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25. Whitehead, Process (above, n. 6), p. 67.
26. This is a term that Whitehead borrows from Locke: ibid., pp. 51-60.
27. Ibid.,p. 29.
28. Whitehead, Adventures (above, n. 11), p. 176.
29. Whitehead, Process (above, n. 6), p. 67.
makes it clear that his position is not some simple refusal or denial
of science: “I assume as an axiom that science is not a fairy tale.”30
Instead, his ontology (and that of Deleuze) emphasizes the need to
develop theoretical approaches that can describe the complex inter-
relations of reality and the process by which materiality is attained.
A further discussion of this will be developed later through an analy-
sis of the virtual and the actual.
My analysis so far has outlined Whitehead’s ontological position:
his attempts to balance facticity and becoming, individuality and ex-
tensivity, materiality and subjectivity. In the remainder of the paper
I will attempt to develop these themes through a comparison of his
work with that of Deleuze. I will commence by outlining Deleuze’s
usage of the term “singularities,” with a view to considering their
similarity to Whitehead’s “actual entities.” This will establish the role
that each plays in the development of a nonessentialist ontology.
Introducing Singularities
As stated previously, it has often been the case that commentators
have stressed the status of flux, flow, and becoming in the work of
Deleuze. However, I hold that such an overemphasis is mistaken. In
order to substantiate that claim and to outline the status of materi-
ality/physicality within Deleuze’s texts, and also as a first move in
delineating the similarities between his work and that of Whitehead,
it is necessary to focus on his notion of singularities.
In an introductory reference, Deleuze states: “Beneath the general
operation of laws . . . there always remains the play of singulari-
ties.”31 This asserts the status of singularities as that which is not cap-
tured or explainable by customary descriptions of the world as a gen-
erally well-ordered place. It also hints at their metaphysical priority.
This is developed when Deleuze obliquely argues that they cannot be
contained or described by concepts, and that they differ among
themselves—indeed, they are harbingers of difference. “Specific dif-
ference . . . in no way represents a universal concept (that is to say, an
Idea) encompassing all the singularities and turnings of difference.”32
This is a negative definition, in that it says that singularities are
not immediately linked to concepts but does not positively describe
the relation between concepts and singularities. This negative form
of definition continues when Deleuze states that “singularity is be-
yond particular propositions no less than universality is beyond gen-
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31. Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (London: Athlone Press, 1994), p. 21.
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eral propositions.”33 Yet, singularities play a crucial role within
Deleuze’s work: they account for differential distribution within what
he terms the “virtual,” which is not actualized as different, is not yet
individuated. Thus: “the distribution of singularities belongs entirely
to the conditions of the problem, while their specification already
refers to solutions constructed under these conditions. . . . The prob-
lem is at once transcendent and immanent in relation to these solu-
tions.”34 Materiality is something that is attained through actualiza-
tion and in relation to the set of “real” conditions within which and
from which it arises. In Whiteheadian terms, there is no indifferent
relation between the extensive continuum and the actual entities
that arise out of it. Thus, in a short passage that echoes the work of
Whitehead: “This is how, in the case of the organic, the process of
actualisation appears simultaneously as the local differenciation of
parts, the global formation of an internal milieu, and the solution of
a problem posed within the field of constitution of an organism.”35
Once again, there is no strict definition of singularities; it is not
possible to work out what they are. Just as actual entities play a pre-
cise role in Whitehead’s theory, so singularities play a specific role in
Deleuze’s36—for, as with Whitehead’s actual entities, they are never
encountered as such.37 Singularities are that which becomes prob-
lematized and consequently constitutes individuality; in themselves
they are not individuals in the usual sense, for such individuals are
resultants.
Singularities do not express the solidity of objects, they do not ex-
hibit the reality of Newtonian self-identical things. Rather, they ex-
press reality as qualitative difference: “Singularity and intensity are
terms used to articulate a thought robbed of the organizing principle
of the individual.”38 In the same vein as Whitehead’s characteriza-
tion of his “epochal theory of time” in terms of quanta—literally
packages or pulses of time, superseding each other—the reality of
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35. Ibid., p. 211
36. I am grateful to Eric Alliez for confirming, to me, the similarity between White-
head’s actual entities and Deleuze’s singularities and their importance for establishing
a nonessentialist ontology.
37. Although, in one of his final texts, Deleuze does give the following, intriguing ex-
ample: “very small children all resemble one another and have hardly any individual-
ity, but they have singularities: a smile, a gesture, a funny face” (Gilles Deleuze, Pure
Immanence: Essays on a Life [New York: Zone Books], p. 30).
38. Nick Millett, “The Trick of Singularity,” Theory, Culture and Society 14:2 (1997): 54.
such singularities does not rely upon quantitative distinctions; in-
stead, singularities are different and distinguishable in terms of their
intensity—they are quanta.39 The role of singularities is to provide “a
prior metastable state . . . the existence of a ‘disparateness’ . . . be-
tween which potentials are distributed.”40 This is not yet a descrip-
tion of singularities; rather, it is a description of an intensive field, a
plane of immanence, an extensive continuum. For, like Whitehead’s
extensive continuum, such a field is not a flat, uniform or passive ex-
panse—there are specificities here, but they are not individual, they
are singularities: ”Such a pre-individual state nevertheless does not
lack singularities: the distinctive or singular points are defined by the
existence and distribution of potentials. An ‘objective’ problematic
field thus appears.”41 Reality is an undulating plane, and this applies
no less to that reality to which science devotes itself. A recognition
of this (by science) might lead, not to a disbarring of science, but to
better, fuller scientific accounts—though this may involve develop-
ing a different understanding and practice of science.42
Deleuze’s objective problematic field describes the relations be-
tween elements that are not yet actual (although for Whitehead they
would once have been actual); they are still real, but not in the sense
of being thinglike. This does not mean that such a field is an inert
substrate upon which actuality bases itself, for this field is consti-
tuted through the interrelation of potentials. Just as Whitehead at-
tempts to dispel the notion of indifferent matter that awaits percep-
tion or constitution, Deleuze posits a field of differentiated but
interrelated, intensive singulars that express potentiality.
For Whitehead, that which permeates and explains this proces-
sual relation of the extensive continuum to the actual entities that
arise out of it is the concept of creativity:
Creativity is the principle of novelty. An actual occasion is a novel entity di-
verse from any entity in the “many” that it unifies. It is that ultimate princi-
ple by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one
actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively. The “creative advance”
is the application of this ultimate principle of creativity to each novel situa-
tion which it originates.43
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However, Whitehead also stresses the importance of repetition
within this more general scheme. That is to say, this novelty is not
entirely new, for within each becoming novel there is a dual repeti-
tion: the first repetition is the repetition of becoming itself; the sec-
ond is that what becomes, in itself, repeats the universe in a novel
way. As seen earlier, Whitehead puts it as follows: “These various as-
pects can be summed up in the statement that experience involves a
becoming, that becoming means that something becomes, and that what
becomes involves repetition transformed into novel immediacy.”44 So,
novelty expresses difference; the category of creativity encapsulates
difference—it gives it its own concept.
For Deleuze, Nietzsche rather than Whitehead is the writer who has
done most to further this idea through his notion of eternal return.
Yet it is notable that this reading of Nietzsche fits closely with the pre-
vious analysis of Whitehead. Hence: “Returning is being, but only the
being of becoming. The eternal return does not bring back ‘the same’,
but returning constitutes the only Same of that which becomes. Re-
turning is the becoming-identical of becoming itself.”45 So, returning
has the same role for Deleuze as creativity has for Whitehead: “The
wheel in the eternal return is at once both production of repetition
on the basis of difference and selection of difference on the basis of
repetition.”46 However, this is not some simple, serial becoming that
dissipates the universe into a Heraclitean flux. Consistent instead with
Whitehead’s “epochal theory of time,” Deleuze manages to avoid such
dissipation through his introduction of the distinction between the
virtual and the actual. These concepts play a vital role within his work,
and will be addressed throughout the remainder of this paper.
The Virtual and the Actual
The virtual is opposed not to the real but to the actual. The virtual is fully real
in so far as it is virtual. Exactly what Proust said of states of resonance must be
said of the virtual: “Real without being actual, ideal without being abstract”;
and symbolic without being fictional. Indeed, the virtual must be defined as
strictly a part of the real object—as though the object had one part of itself in
the virtual into which it plunged as though into an objective dimension.47
It would seem that the work of Whitehead could be helpful in refut-
ing Alain Badiou’s claim that either the actual or the virtual must be
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granted precedence in terms of their claims to reality.48 It is White-
head’s notion of the extensive continuum that most closely corre-
sponds to that of the virtual. Most especially, it is his discussion of
the process of the creation of actual entities out of such a contin-
uum—and the return of these entities into the continuum—as con-
stituting the being of becoming, that will help elucidate how the vir-
tual and the actual can be equally real and yet separate. Whitehead
clearly states that the extensive continuum, in itself, is real but not
actual, and that the extensive continuum does not correspond to,
nor is it exhausted by, its actualization by actual entities; though
once the extensive continuum (or the virtual) is actualized, it ceases
to be virtual: “Thus though everything is real, it is not necessarily re-
alized in some particular set of actual occasions.”49 So, although
Whitehead does not use the term “virtual,” this extensive contin-
uum could be said to be virtual in the sense that “virtualities exist in
such a way that they actualize themselves in splitting up and being
divided.”50 And, although Deleuze does not use the term “extensive
continuum,” it would seem that his notion of the actualization of
the virtual (or virtuality) could be better understood by approximat-
ing it to Whitehead’s ontology. 
For example, Deleuze conceives of the relationship between the
virtual and the actual as follows:
When the virtual content of an Idea is actualised, the varieties of relation are
incarnated in distinct species while the singular points which correspond to
the values of one variety are incarnated in the distinct parts characteristic of
this or that species. The Idea of colour, for example, is like white light which
perplicates itself in the genetic elements and the relations of all the colours,
but is actualised in the diverse colours with their respective spaces. . . . There
is even a white society and a white language, the latter being that which con-
tains in its virtuality all the phonemes and relations destined to be actualised
in diverse languages and in the distinctive parts of a given language.51
Perhaps approaching this somewhat difficult passage from a White-
headian perspective will both produce clarity and demonstrate the
importance of reading Deleuze through Whitehead (and vice versa).
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However, before doing so, it remains necessary to introduce one of
Whitehead’s more difficult technical terms, namely, “eternal ob-
jects.” Although eternal objects play a complex and somewhat dis-
puted role in his work, it is clear that he intends the term to describe
the relation that the utter potentiality of the universe bears to the
facticity of actual entities: “The eternal objects are the pure poten-
tials of the universe; and the actual entities differ from each other in
their realization of potentials.”52 Hence (and to return to the long
Deleuze quote above), colors, as eternal objects, express the poten-
tiality that informs nascent items of matter (actual entities). Eternal
objects are complex and relational, and are always associated with
the conceptual aspect of becoming (they are therefore closely related
to the Deleuzean concept of Idea). They are real but do not exist un-
til they ingress into particular becomings (until they are actualized,
hence moving from virtual to actual through the process of incar-
nating matter). Such actualization is not random, it is affected by the
environment and the past of the actual entities into which the eter-
nal objects ingress. Colors are always prehended in a certain way,
which depends upon the structuring of the organism in question;
thus, although whiteness itself exhibits a continuity (there is a white
society), the manner in which it is felt will differ from organism to
organism.
All subjects are alive, in that they all receive and reformulate the
extensive continuum and communicate with each other within the
extensive continuum, yet they are also all different—so any descrip-
tion of how they feel and assimilate eternal objects cannot be lim-
ited to human language. That is to say, although human language is
clearly, in itself, communicatory, both Whitehead and Deleuze insist
that there are other forms of communication that are integral to ex-
istence. This is the role of prehensions, as discussed earlier; they keep
what might appear as discrete in touch with other elements in the
extensive continuum. “Each atom is a system of all things.”53 There-
fore language is one form of communication among many. Hence,
Deleuze asserts that whiteness comprises, in its virtuality, all the po-
tential of being white, which will always be actualized differently ac-
cording to the individual that incarnates whiteness. Language is not
to be distrusted, but is itself to be seen as diverse.
Therefore, there will be different languages for different entities or
assemblages of entities. Also, within any language there will be dis-
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tinctions and divisions that enable singularities to pass into individ-
uals. It is at this point that the work of Whitehead and Deleuze be-
comes especially pertinent for analyses of the relations between ma-
teriality and subjectivity, and for developing a nonessentialist
ontology. Now individuation becomes a matter of division. And this
division is not merely physical (biological division into categories
such as species, genus, anatomical difference) but conceptual, in the
Whiteheadian and Deleuzean sense. That is, it is not simple social
constructionism (the way different societies or cultures grant differ-
ent meanings to certain given factors—Margaret Mead’s work, for ex-
ample). Nor is it complex social constructionism (where matter is
denigrated or made inaccessible through the priority of a signifying
system or cultural intelligibility).54 Whitehead and Deleuze manage
to establish a nonessentialist ontology by insisting upon the reality
of both the extensive continuum (or the virtual) and the actuality of
contemporary existence. Neither the extensive continuum nor the
virtual provides an absolute ground for existence; they express a lim-
ited yet infinite potentiality that is neither fully exhausted nor real-
ized by those individuals that arise out of it. As stated above, this ap-
plies not only to philosophy but also to science; for surely science
has always been resolutely ontological.
Hence, matter, meaning, subjectivity, and sense all happen at
once. They are neither social nor material, nor are they ultimately re-
ducible to either one or the other; the two sides are needed together.
Hence social divisions are material divisions, and vice versa. They
cannot be separated. Even this is too simplistic, however, for within
such a scheme, neither the material nor the social retain their usual
sense. This is both the demand and the difficulty that Whitehead
and Deleuze offer contemporary theory. I shall take up this demand
with a “concrete” example in my conclusion.
Conclusion
Just as Whitehead’s philosophy is imbued with the idea of process
(of the going beyond each actual occasion), for Deleuze, actualiza-
tion is never a complete rendering of the virtual:
events of the surface are actualized in the present of bodies . . . by imprison-
ing first their singularities within the limits of worlds, individuals and persons.
There is also another movement wherein the event implies something exces-
sive in relation to its actualization, something that overthrows worlds, indi-
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viduals and persons, and leaves them to the depth of the ground which works
and dissolves them.55
As has been seen, process, or the move from the virtual to the actual,
never exhausts the creativity, force, or power that characterizes the
total implication of matter and subjectivity in each other. Over and
beyond immediate actualizations of events in contemporary bodies,
there remains the force of the eventfulness of the universe which
creates the future and the past in distinction to the present. (This is
akin to Whitehead’s notion of creativity as discussed earlier.)
Moving away from the problem posed by scientific accounts that
suppose a fixed, external world, I now turn to the problem of the sta-
tus of the human subject that is often taken to survey such a world.
This is not a problem for Whitehead and Deleuze, insofar as they
view the world as neither flat nor given; hence, the subject does not
exist prior to its orientation and instantiation in relation to its wider
environment. With regard to the status of subjectivity within such a
process (see above, notes 12 and 20), both Whitehead and Deleuze
would deny any absolute interiority to such subjectivity; however,
they would still make a distinction between the inside and the out-
side: “The outside is not a fixed limit but a moving matter animated
by peristaltic movements, folds and foldings that together make up
an inside: they are not something other than the outside, but pre-
cisely the inside of the outside.”56 In this sense, the outside works in
a similar way to Whitehead’s extensive continuum: it is out of this
that subjects are created. This does not mean that such subjects have
an inside that is of a different kind from the rest of being. These are
not subjects as opposed to objects. The foldings that constitute sub-
jectivity are temporary renderings of an outside. They are the public
made private only insofar as this privacy will become public again.57
Subjectivity is a moment and a place within the ongoing movement
of a wider field—namely, the virtual or the extensive continuum. For
Deleuze, such subjectivity is characterized in terms of a fold.58 Thus,
each subject or fold is a social, physical, and historical rendering: so-
cial, in that it incorporates elements of the public into a singular en-
tity; physical, in that it is an actual rendering of elements of the uni-
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verse; historical, in that its formation arises from the prior and par-
ticular arrangement of previous folds, and problems within which it
is situated. As Whitehead also puts it, the world comprises a “cir-
cumambient space of social physical activity.”59 There is hence no
genuine distinction between the material and the social, between
subjects and objects; all existence is a complex combination of the
two. The gulf between nature as the province of science and the in-
terrelation of subjects as the province of social theory (and the hu-
manities) has been overcome. I shall conclude with a tentative ex-
ample of how the work of Whitehead and Deleuze could be
deployed within sociology.
Just as some commentators present a Deleuzean analysis limited
to tracing flows, flights, and deterritorialization, and reveling in flu-
idity, there is the parallel danger of focusing exclusively on White-
head’s emphasis on process. But it is clear that, contrary to any such
readings, both philosophers simply view the universe as eventful.
Subjects and objects do appear within this eventfulness, but they are
neither primary nor originary. Hence, Whitehead and Deleuze’s em-
phasis on becoming and process could be used to investigate con-
temporary forms of actualization, not just the distinctive mobility of
contemporary society.
For example, within current sociology and anthropology, the so-
cial is often considered to be some form of a flow.60 Arjun Appadurai,
in particular, presents migration as one of a series of disjunctive
spaces of flow, which together constitute the global cultural econ-
omy.61 But this is only half the story; it remains at the level of the
virtual. It is possible to utilize the work of Whitehead and Deleuze to
broaden the scope of such analyses. For viewing migration as an
event within the process of existence is equivalent to regarding it as
a resultant of the interrelation of a variety of singularities—but mi-
gration is always actualized in states of affairs and bodies. Contem-
porary analyses should examine the actualizations of such becom-
ings in terms of the fixing of the virtual into the present, and the
actualization of the event into concrete states of affairs and bodies.
These actualizations will take the form of classifying and discrimi-
nating singularities into individual bodies; so that they are physi-
cally rendered, for instance, as either a tourist, a refugee, or an asy-
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lum seeker. These are not just labels or categories: they are the hard,
physical, manifestation in individualized bodies. The event is
thereby actualized in such a manner that singularities are individu-
ated and ordered into groups in which they are deemed to be the
same—thereby disavowing the difference within and between them,
the difference that constitutes them in their becomings. That is to
say, a major aspect of the present in the United Kingdom of the early
twenty-first century is the necessity to be physically actualized as a
citizen, visitor, genuine applicant for residency, or illegal entrant.
These are not the only actualizations; there are others that cut across
the space and time of the same individuated body and yet are actu-
alized within a different body. However, it will be possible to trace
the history that links such different actualizations to the previously
individuated body.
On this view, individual subjectivity must be regarded as a twist-
ing of a social, physical environment. The physicality in question
does not limit the body to its own immediacy—its genes, molecules,
cells, and so on—but opens it up, through the reconceptualization of
the physical; that is to say, the conceptual is to be seen as an integral
element of the physical. “It is even this twisting which defines
‘Flesh’, beyond the body proper and its objects”;62 “we cannot tell
with what molecules the body ends and the external world be-
gins.”63 But this is not a dispersal of the body, to the extent that in-
dividual renderings of it become lost in a wider universe of flux. In-
stead, it is a question of eliciting both the dispersion and the
sedimentation of the body, as well as of subjectivity, with regard to
the wider social and physical environment. Such elicitings are not
simply cultural descriptions of an already existent physical field.
Rather, they would constitute the description and redescription of
the folds that constitute contemporary subjectivity.
Clearly descriptions of this sort would require a subtle account of
the interrelation of materiality and subjectivity, if they are to engage
fully with the physicality of the body. However, in order not to fall
back into some form of essentialism, it is necessary that they utilize
a nonessentialist ontology. I hope that by focusing in this paper on
the interrelation of Whitehead and Deleuze, I have provided a way
of furthering such analyses—that Whitehead and Deleuze may be
seen as providing a way of approaching the process of attending ma-
teriality/physicality in a social environment that is neither counter-
posed to a natural environment nor reducible to any strict scientific
conception of a fixed, external, object-filled universe.
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